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Abstract
We are aware that to resist in the coming age of bioinformational capitalism, we will require new
knowledge ecologies. These knowledges must be socialist: able to resist the dominance of
productivist and imperialist pedagogies that are saturated with capital, and now bioinformational
capital’s aims. These knowledges must also be stupid: able to refuse bioinformational capital’s
lust for visibility and access to the working class biology. Stupidity is able to resist primarily
because it can’t be quantified, articulated, or rendered transparent. To express the importance of
this refusal, we visit concepts of colonialism and disability. Disabled and colonized struggles
animate the importance of protecting anti-value: and using anti-value in the struggle against
oppression. In this paper, we propose a theory and practice of stupidity as anti-value: a socialist
and anti-imperialist form of resistance.
Keywords: knowledge socialism, stupidity, anti-value, anti-imperialism, critical disability
studies, autism, bioinformational capitalism.
Introduction
Capitalism is by its very nature dynamic. As a social relation between labor and capital, between
the dispossessed and expropriators, capitalism is a constant struggle over not just the production
of value, but the conditions of life itself. The latter is the reason why capitalism, to exist as a proper
mode of production, had to not only dispossess people from the means of subsistence—and
therefore to produce a class compelled to sell their labor-power—but also to dispossess us of our
skills and knowledges by transferring them to machinery (dead labor, or fixed capital).
Bioinformational capitalism can be seen as a further step in this process, with capitalist innovations
‘that control, change and experiment with the material basis of life’ (Peters 2012: 98). This material
basis is more than our social relations and ways of life: it is our very biology.
Faced with this configuration of capitalism, some critical theorists and activists find an
antidote in open source or common ownership over knowledge and information. At first blush,
this seems appropriate as it works to reduce or eliminate the private ownership of the contemporary
means of production. Yet this path, as we show below, is not only inadequate but on its own can
also work to reinforce the underlying pedagogical logic of bioinformational capitalism, or what
we call, following Melissa Gregg (2018), productivist pedagogy. Gregg uses productivist
pedagogy to refer to apps, self-help books, and other media that assist in raising personal
productivity, but leaves the pedagogical aspect of productivist pedagogy unexamined. We
conceptualize productivist pedagogy as an orientation to the world that positions the unknown as

that which not only can but must be known, the opaque as that which must be articulated, the mute
as that which must be spoken. Bioinformational capitalism clearly approaches the material and
biological life in this way: the body is a puzzle to be solved.
Finding recourse to the common as the remedy to exploitation, however, operates along
the same pedagogical axis. In fact, it can deepen and intensify it as the commons is legitimated by
being more productive than capitalism. This is, for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s
(2009) main argument for the common as it relates to education: ‘The central tools are no longer
the spinning loom or cotton gin or metal press, but rather linguistic tools, affective tools for
constructing relationships, tools for thinking, and so forth.’ This latter set, which ‘humans already
have’, need ‘to be developed. ‘That is why basic and advanced education is even more important
in the biopolitical economy than it was previously. Everyone needs to learn how to work with
language, codes, ideas, and affects—and moreover to work with others, none of which comes
naturally’ (308). Providing free and open access to training in these areas is one part of expanding
our ability to fully cooperate in and produce the common. Because the privatization of knowledge
‘limits access to ideas and information’, it thereby ‘thwarts creativity and innovation’ (Hardt and
Negri 2004: 185). As such, increasing access to and training in immaterial production will unleash
the true surplus of our productive capacities.
Productivist pedagogy is grounded in the need for communication, which is what
bioinformational capitalism’s private (or quasi-private) databanks as well as alternative common
databanks of open-source facilitate. As Phoebe Moore and Andrew Robinson (2016: 2775) note
in their study of the quantified self, ‘[c]apital encourages universal communication, but only in
quantified terms, and thus, anything that cannot be quantified and profiled is rendered
incommunicable — meaning that it is marked and marginalised, disqualified as human capital and
denied privilege’. Under bioinformational capitalism, however, these marginal spaces are
colonized and mined for value by technologies and practices that measure and quantify ‘what were
formerly treated as immeasurable, qualitative aspects of the labour process or the self’ (2779).
In what follows, we show how such a productivist pedagogy is the fundamental educational
motor of not only capitalism (in its bioinformational, colonial, and imperialist forms) but also its
attendant oppressions such as ableism. In what follows, we show how such a productivist
pedagogy is the fundamental educational motor of not only capitalism (in its bioinformational,
colonial, and imperialist forms) but also its attendant oppressions such as ableism. In response, we
propose a theory and practice of stupidity as a socialist and anti-imperialist form of resistance, one
that is subversive precisely because it is not productive. Stupidity as a knowledge thwarts
bioinformational capitalism’s attempts and ability to valorize and exploit knowledge: thereby
repelling its increasing command over labor and life. The primary reason is that stupidity can’t be
quantified, measured, communicated, articulated, or rendered transparent. This means that
stupidity is not a lack of determinate knowledge because such a lack would always refer to
something that is already known. Stupidity, then, is not ‘opposed to knowledge’ but rather entails
‘the absence of a relation to knowing’ (Ronell 2002: 5). Viewed this way, the current struggle is

not merely one of ownership but one of pedagogy as well. Stupidity becomes a key aspect of a
knowledge ecology oriented against bioinformational capitalist exploitation and oppression.
Bioinformational Capitalism and Actually-Existing Artificial Intelligence
While the ethical and political implications of bioinformational capitalism continue to be explored
and struggled over, the role of knowledge in this struggle has been given scant attention thus far.
This is an interesting and problematic omission, given that the very thrust of bioinformational
capitalism is precisely to know and understand ‘biological processes through the development of
computationally intensive techniques including pattern recognition, data mining, machine learning
algorithms, and visualization’ (Peters 2012: 104). Bioinformational capitalism is precisely
concerned with the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of this knowledge, as
each is an integral node in the production of surplus value. These processes entail both the
digitalization of biology as well as the biologization of the digital. The first concerns the harvesting
and storing of biological information in ever-expanding databases, while the latter—which is the
primary focus of this chapter—concerns the creation of new digital networks and technologies that
work like ‘the inner mechanisms of the human brain’ (105).
The capitalist biologization of the digital manifests most clearly in Artificial Intelligences
(AI), a term coined in a proposal for a 1956 Dartmouth College workshop by mathematics
professor John McCarthy (who taught at Dartmouth), researcher Marvin Minsky (a Junior Fellow
at Harvard University), computer scientist Nathaniel Rochester (employed by IBM), and
information theory founder Claude Shannon (who worked at Bell Telephone Laboratories). They
proposed ‘to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other
feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to
stimulate it’ (McCarthy et al. 1955: 1). It is not a coincidence that the only aspect of intelligence
mentioned in the proposal is learning, although they later include the use of language, abstraction,
and calculation, as well as ‘self-improvement’, ‘randomness and creativity’ (3). The primary
obstacle was to move beyond input-output procedures at the level of the machine to the machine’s
ability to detect or ‘sense’ changes in the machine’s environment.
Yet there are different kinds of artificial intelligence as well as numerous aspirations for
such technologies. Both the definitions of existing and aspirational AI revolve around the ability
to define ‘the parameters of artificiality, or the ways in which computers are unlike human
intelligence’ (Cope et al. 2020: 2). Existing AI is simultaneously subordinate to human
intelligence—in that it can only calculate—and superior to human intelligence—in that it can
calculate bigger and more complex formulas at faster speeds. Thus, our current era of AI
intelligence is ‘more accurately labeled the binary age’ instead of ‘the digital’ (2).
For Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikkola Kjøsen, and James Steinhoff (2019: 9), ‘the
essence of AI—indeed, the essence of intelligence—is the ability to make appropriate
generalizations in a timely fashion based on limited data’. They refer to ‘actually-existing-AIcapitalism’, which denotes ‘a phase of experimental and uneven adoption of the technologies in
which so many hopes are invested’ (2). The largest form of AI here is machine learning, in which

machinery takes in data, processes it, builds models on it, and uses these models to make
predictions. Some forms of machine learning entail ‘deep learning’, in which networks do the
aforementioned while at the same time continually modifying the weight given to different factors
of data.
To speak of an artificial intelligence is to restate and re-entrench its distinction and
separation from non-artificial or human intelligence. Thus, another problem is to what human
intelligence refers at any given moment. One result is the ‘AI-effect’, whereby ‘as soon as AI can
do something, it is no longer considered to require intelligence’ (9). The artificial-human divide
changes, although there hasn’t been sufficient inquiry into what counts as intelligence in the first
place. If one can’t make calculations, abstractions, or predictions based on data, are they neither
machine nor human? More fundamentally problematic on our reading, however, is the very desire
to render the human visible in order to biologize the digital. Capitalism has always been driven by
this desire. We should remember that capitalism only grew into a proper mode of production with
the development of large-scale industry and machinery, or when capital moved from the formal
subjection to real subjection of labor. This transition, for Marx (1867/1967: 425), is complete as
soon as ‘it is now no longer the labourer that employs the means of production, but the means of
production that employ the labourer’. During capital’s early years it took existing forms of
production (handicraft and manufacture) and only modified them under its command. The problem
it confronted was that both forms of production were regulated by labor because the knowledges
and skills required for production were held within workers themselves.
With the development of machinery, the relationship between living labor and dead labor
(as manifested in machinery) is inverted such that the latter become the driving and regulating
force of production. For this reason, as Marx (1939/1993: 694) wrote in his Grundrisse notebooks,
‘machinery appears… as the most adequate form of fixed capital, and fixed capital, in so far as
capital’s relations with itself are concerned, appears as the most adequate form of capital as such’.
The reason machinery is the most sufficient form of capital is because it absorbs ‘the accumulation
of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain… into capital, as
opposed to labor’ (694). The English translation is appearance, but as Mario Tronti (2009: 179)
observes, Marx actually wrote erscheinen, which is translated as appear, but often ‘should be
translated as “presents itself”, a meaning very close to the verb “to be”’. In other words, the
appearance isn’t an ideological distortion we can clear away but works on the very ontology of the
process. It is, after all, workers who produce machinery.
Yet the fact that machinery regulates the production process is both an appearance and a
reality, as anyone who works machinery will confirm. Nature doesn’t produce machinery: ‘they
are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified’
(706, emphasis in original). Within these pages between the sixth and seventh notebooks, Marx
introduces the concept—written in English—of the ‘general intellect,’ which refers to the extent
to which ‘general social knowledge has become a direct force of production’ (706, emphasis in
original). While there are important debates over the general intellect and the contradictory
tendencies Marx charts in these two notebooks (where fixed capital produces wealth and

undermines labor-time as the source of value while at the same time forcing workers to work
longer hours under worse conditions), there are two that interest us here.
One is Paolo Virno’s reconceptualization of the general intellect under contemporary
capitalism. For Virno, while the general intellect is composed of particular knowledges, ideas,
capacities, inclinations, and so on, he puts his emphasis on the generality of the general intellect.
The particular manifestations of the general intellect, that is, are less important than the general
capacities of the intellect. Rather than designating ‘the aggregate of the knowledge acquired by the
species,’ the concept indicates ‘the faculty of thinking; potential as such, not its countless particular
realizations’ (Virno 2004: 66). The resources of the general intellect include ‘the faculty of
language, the disposition to learn, memory, the capacity to abstract and relate, and the inclination
towards self-reflexivity’ (Virno 2007: 6). In other words, Marx fixed the general intellect in
machinery, but Virno insists it is also a part of the overall social totality and finds its most adequate
expression in the human.
Dyer-Witheford, Kjøsen, and Steinhoff (2019) find Virno’s reconceptualization too
anthropocentric by noting that these human capacities can be properties of AI. AI machinery
possesses the ability to manipulate language, to cooperate, and to produce and negotiate infinite
combinations of concepts and models. And while AI can’t ‘feel’, it can nonetheless ‘interpret
feelings as data’ (66). Missed in this critique is a definition of communication, however. This leads
us to David Harvey’s (2019: 97) recent observation of Marx’s general intellect, which is that
Marx’s use of the concept is only focused on particular forms of ‘knowledge and mental
capabilities’ that can be ‘incorporated into the fixed capital of production of value so as to raise
the productivity of labour to the point where labour, the agent of value production, becomes
redundant’. Harvey smooths any gap between Virno’s concept of the general intellect and the
aforementioned critique because he notes that the general intellect is open to any knowledge that
can be embodied in fixed capital. The flipside is that ‘all those knowledges that cannot be
embedded in fixed capital are irrelevant’ (97). More than that: they are anti-values.
Under capitalism, value is a constantly expanding process in which value is produced,
circulated, and realized through purchase and consumption. Any interruption or blockage results
in non-values, while anything that blocks the movement of value is an anti-value. Tronti’s (2009:
254) strategy of refusal consists in ‘the organisation of the working-class “No”: the refusal to
collaborate actively in capitalist development, the refusal to put forward a positive programme of
demands’. By refusing to advance demands, the aspirations of the working-class can’t be absorbed
into or accommodated by capital. Such refusal also entails the refusal of intellectuality itself.
‘There is no culture, no intellectuals’, he writes, ‘apart from those who serve capital’ (254). Put
differently, the production of anti-value is the production of stupidity as the other of the intellect.
This is exactly the issue that Dyer-Witheford et al. (2019) avoid insofar as they uncritically accept
capital’s definition of intelligence as that which operates according to capitalism’s demands of
timeliness and productivity. Indeed, throughout their book they equate intelligence with the ability
to perform.

Disabling Capital
We return to stupidity as anti-value at the end of the chapter, and for now delve deeper into capital’s
insatiable desire for intelligence and demands for communicability, articulation, and visibility. We
will feel the oppressive outcomes of capital’s lust for intellect, and thereby animate the importance
of refusing it all together. We can understand many activist disability groupings and individuals
as the vanguard of such refusal, embodying Tronti’s ‘No’—whispered everywhere amongst the
working people. Disability, an exceptionally broad category, presents alternative ways of being,
thinking, and living that repel capital’s desire for intelligence and communicability, productivity
and visibility. In many ways, the ‘severity’ of disability revolves precisely around the degree to
which one is slow, unintelligible, and can or cannot meet the demands of productivity under
capitalism. One of us, for example, is medically diagnosed with learning and behavioral
disabilities, but does not identify as disabled because they don’t experience their exploitation and
oppression under capitalism as a determinant factor in their lives. Generally speaking, however,
disability is subjected to a burning scrutiny under the lens of bioinformational capitalism,
however. Organic-digital technologies (Peters et al. 2020: 4) are directed toward their biological
materiality, as capital marches forth to control and conquer the material basis of labor (Peters 2012:
98). The working people’s biology can either enable or disable the production of surplus value,
which explains this emerging capitalism’s obsession with disabled biologies. Rather than relegate
disability to the margin, it is salivated over, understood, exposed, and strip searched for new
reservoirs of value.
Capital’s twenty-first century obsession with bioinformation leads back to its desire for
intelligence. Saturated with capital’s aims, intelligence adopts an arrogant view toward the
unknown, and becomes synonymous with answering questions, eliminating confusion, and
mastering certainty. It also allows for communication: which constitutes the means of production
for the immaterial economy, and has become hegemonic within the totality of capitalism (Ford
2020: 104). Immaterial commodities such as language, codes, data, and ideas constitute a vortex
for capital. The global north harbors this hegemonic center, where you will find the babbling,
articulate worker of the communicative age rather than the silent worker of the industrial age. As
the north deindustrialized, it pushed the silent subject into the margins of the global south: pointing
to how the demand for intelligence and communicability affects the global working class in
gradients. But increasingly, everywhere, working-class jobs revolve around engaging in
conversation and collaboration with customers, coworkers, and management. Even the culture is
dominated by raving news anchors, debating experts, talk shows, podcasts, devil’s advocates, and
hot takes: the demand to speak and feel intelligent is overwhelming.
Capital lusts after intelligence and communication because, on the one hand, these are its
hegemonic means of production. On the other hand, articulation helps make the unknown known.
Communication skills are developed within the multitude to ‘empower’ us to speak aloud
innermost thoughts, hopes, and dreams: rendering our secrets transparent to the eyes of capital.
Only that which is expressed can be surveilled, controlled, and appropriated. We serve capital by

turning the multitude inside out. However useful intelligence has been to capital, that much more
destructive stupidity has been to it.
Stupidity is weaponized by those who are unknowing and will not communicate, who are
mute and will not cooperate, who are slow and will not hasten. Capital has no use for lost,
wandering subjects whose knowledge and intelligence cannot be recruited against labor (Harvey
2019: 97). Neurologically different, disabled people stand in the way of capital’s drive for surplus
value, for which they face an intense oppression. Under bioinformational capitalism, disabled
knowledges and biologies are slated for annihilation and extraction.
Feel The Oppression: The Bioinformational War on Autism
Of particular interest to our research and organizing agenda against bioinformational capitalism
are disability labels and diagnoses that are or entail the label of ‘intellectual’ disability. Autism is
one particularly important example. Around the same time that bioinformational capitalism was
emerging in the neoliberal world, an ‘autism epidemic’ was announced by every major institution
in North America. In Anne McGuire’s (2016) historically specific study of autism as a neoliberal
cultural phenomenon, we feel the effects of bioinformational capitalism on autism—one concrete
example of disabled life.
In the early 2000s, autism was suddenly on the lips of the president, of news anchors,
medical experts, celebrity psychologists, doctors, and school board trustees. As diagnoses and
cases of autism surged, the public was warned about this latest form of stupidity that was seizing
upon the (white, middle-class) children of America. The reason this warning is attached to children
is because children, as opposed to adults, can still be good investments. McGuire (2016: 19) recalls
that autism was labeled ‘a biological problem necessitating a biomedical solution; an illness
needing to be stopped, cured, fixed, eliminated’. Nongovernmental organizations amassed millions
from wealthy donors to fight the disorder. Autism Speaks1 became the largest and richest advocacy
organization, and till this day, adopts the puzzle piece as its logo: symbolizing bioinformational
capitalism’s approach to the working body as a puzzle to be solved: to be taken apart and
reassembled. Autism Speaks leaders summarized the violent, anti-disability atmosphere of this
time perfectly when they announced ‘a federal declaration of war on the epidemic of autism’
(World Heritage Encyclopedia 2006).
During this ‘war’, autistic people themselves were hardly consulted: their experience and
knowledge of autistic life and being was precluded. This follows the long history of the oppression
and exclusion of disabled people, which coincides with the long history of the construction of
‘intelligence’ and also ‘whiteness’ and even ‘citizenship’. As Anna Stubblefield (2007) notes, ‘the
possession of intellect, defined as the capacity to produce civilization, has been the principal
distinction drawn by white elites to mark the difference between white and nonwhite races’ (169).
In the service of racial capitalism, research was designed to measure intelligence, but those
researching believed in the intellectual superiority of the white race, and so this was the standard
to the tests themselves. Accordingly, those labeled as ‘disabled’, ‘feebleminded’, ‘idiots’, nd so
1

See https://www.autismspeaks.org/. Accessed 2 June 2021.

on, were necessarily spoken for because they were constructed as lacking the ability for self- and
collective-determination. Relative to autism, non-autistic parents, relatives, professionals,
politicians, and “advocates” from corporate-style nonprofits ‘[understood] themselves as speaking
on behalf of autistic people’ who had no rationality, credibility, or truth (McGuire 2016: 20).
Advocates harnessed financial powers to launch a campaign aimed at remaking autistic children's
nature—to separate them from their disability by any means necessary, at as early an age as
possible.
One of the popular mechanisms was ‘person first language.’ Advocates would insist that
people use the phrase ‘person with autism’ rather than ‘autistic person’ because the latter was,
somehow, insensitive (187). While the new phrase seems banal, McGuire attests that it ‘plays an
important role in supporting the dangerous biomedical presupposition that autism is somehow
separate and separable from a person “with” it’ (227). It performs a separation of a person and
their embodied way of being, and simultaneously makes disability an insult. These moves
necessarily dehumanized disabled people, as Sinclair (1990) contests:
I can be separated from things that are not part of me, and I am still the same person. I am
usually a ‘person with a purple shirt,’ but I could also be a ‘person with a blue shirt’ one
day, and a ‘person with a yellow shirt’ the next day, and I would still be the same person,
because my clothing is not part of me. But autism is part of me.
Like Sinclair, many disabled people claim their disability as part of their identity. Many push
against the process of dehumanization and depersonalization they are subjected to by
bioinformational capitalism, and draw solidarity to other identity contexts. For instance, we would
not say ‘person with Indianness’ over ‘Indian person’; or ‘person with womanhood’ over ‘woman.’
A person is inseparable from their own subjectivity, and any attempt to wrench them apart opens
doors to a host of justifiable violences. Again, however, because disability is such a broad category,
there are a range of ways disabled people choose to refer to themselves, decisions that are
historically, singularly, and locally contingent.
These injustices have come in many forms. We may look to the vast biomedical industry
that has emerged to ‘cure’ autism for some examples. McGuire (2016) documents the wide variety
of treatments and therapies that compromise this industry: behavioral programs and schools,
neurofeedback therapies, speech and physical therapies, social skills therapies, electric shock
therapies; as well as pseudoscientific therapies such as holding therapy and chelation treatments
which can be described as nothing short of torture (127). Even the most mainstream behavioral
therapies are coercive in that they remake a child’s innate nature. Autistic children cry all day in
behavior therapies and schools, as their comfort zones are violated and their boundaries crossed.
They kick, scream, and revolt when they are asked to hold eye contact, sit still, speak clearly, and
obey instructions. While ‘services’ like these are cloaked as ethical and helpful, in reality, they are
coercive and non-consensual: aimed at aligning autistic, capital’s demands for efficiency,
intelligibility, and productivity..

Violence against autistic people is normalized and is expressed most extremely in the high
rates at which they’re murdered with relative impunity. They are murdered most often by their
parents, family members, or the police. Every year, a Disability Day of Mourning is held to mourn
the loss of hundreds of people with disabilities who are killed each year by their own families
(Autistic Self Advocacy Network 2017). In her study, McGuire (2016: 195) collects a lengthy list
of names, dates, and details of autistic children who were killed by their parents to ‘gesture toward
the violent materiality of a cultural desire for “life without autism”’.
Of the many cases, let us look at that of Katie McCarron from Morton, Illinois. Three-yearold Katie was suffocated to death with a plastic garbage bag by her mother, Dr. Karen McCarron,
in 2006 (McGuire 2016: 197). McCarron said that when she first found out about Katie’s diagnosis,
she cried. She became determined to cure Katie of her autism. ‘She was not learning at a rate I
would expect’, McCarron confessed, ‘Everything I tried to do didn’t help her’ — referring to
behavioral schooling (206). At her testimony, McCarron said: ‘I loved Katie very much, but I hated
the autism so, so much…I hated what it was doing to her…I just wanted autism out of my life’
(206). At the trial, when her defense attorney asked McCarron whether she thought she was killing
Katie, she said: ‘No.’ When he asked who she thought she was killing, McCarron answered:
‘Autism’ (207).
We see the violent conclusion of a desire to repress autism in Katie’s murder. A separation
that begins in anti-autistic language, ends in the literal. McGuire traces how violence continues
when the media covers murders like Katie’s, and in how the courts litigate them. The media and
the courts systematically sympathize with the perpetrators, and locate original blame within the
autistic child themselves (McGuire 2016: 207-208). They claim that the root cause of the murder
is the victim: something that plays out in filicides as well as police murders. When mourning the
loss of autistic victims, Autistic Self Advocacy Network explains that the pattern of violence ‘starts
when a parent or caregiver murders their child or adult relative with a disability and continues in
how these murders are reported, discussed, justified, excused, and replicated’ (Disability Day of
Mourning 2021).
Anti-disability violence serves to uphold the hegemony of intelligence and
communicability, which provide the means of production for the totality of capitalism (Ford 2020:
104). This violence has helped the emergence of bioinformational capitalism, which has found
lucrative reservoirs in the effort to destroy uncooperative biologies. A central mission of nonprofits
like Autism Speaks was securing funding for biomedical and biodigital ‘forms of research looking
to cure autism and/or eliminate autistic ways of being’ (McGuire 2016: 57). As this emerging
capitalism develops deeper into the twenty-first century, its orientation to disability has undergone
important updates.
Spectrums Of Disability: Biological System Upgrades
In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) released the fifth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The new release redefines autism as ‘Autism
Spectrum Disorder’ in a move that belies the system’s shift towards spectral thinking. McGuire

(2017: 403) defines spectral thinking as ‘the understanding that our bodies and minds exist on
sliding scales anchored by oppositional poles of health and illness, normalcy and abnormalcy’.
Defining autism as a spectrum marks the ‘beginning of psychiatry’s migration away from strict
categorical approaches to diagnosis, where disorder is either present or absent, and toward
dimensional approaches, where disorder is measured by degree’. Although at first this may seem
like a liberalizing and positive development, McGuire (2017) argues that it instead increases the
surveillance and control of disabled life, and feeds into bioinformational capitalism.
Spectrums rope more people into a disability diagnosis, and ‘empower’ them to slide up
the scale of ability. A narrative of ‘upward mobility’ is initiated, without questioning the premise
of what is ‘up’ and why it is desired (McGuire 2017: 418). It is an ‘inclusive, optimistic, and highly
lucrative narrative of improvement, recovery, and resiliency’ that feeds into an ‘economy of
debility and capacity’ (418). As Jasbir Puar (2012) observes, ‘Debility is profitable to capitalism,
but so is the demand to recover or overcome it’ (154). Bioinformational industries profit from the
need for subjects to recover from abnormalities of unproductiveness. Peters (2012: 105) explains
that genomic capitalism, harnessed with a new generation of information processing, comprises a
bioinformationalism which ‘expresses a new kind of utopian perfectionism about the possibilities
for a new age of genetic self-renewing capitalism that is capable of programming itself’.
Contemporary innovations in genetic engineering, prenatal genetic testing, pre-emptive health
screening, and stimulation of fetal brain development all aim at biomedically preventing disability
before it arrives. Innovations in brain imaging, highly personalized diagnosis and treatment
protocols, early intervention services, and therapeutic remediations aim at repressing disability
once it does arrive. Further than enabling this ‘economy of debility and capacity’, the spectrumization of disability also urges people to increase self-surveillance.
A culture of surveillance and control is enabled in the effort to forge new subjectivities. ‘I
argue that notions of spectrum are giving birth to a unique brand of neoliberal subject’, McGuire
(2017: 418) writes. This novel subject performs incremental and ‘ongoing (read: unending), acts
of (self) surveillance, production and consumption’ to coerce themselves up the sliding scale of
‘bodily value’ (418). Following Robert McRuer, McGuire understands ‘the good spectrum subject’
as ‘one who possesses the capacity, flexibility and capital to move along the pathological
gradations of a continuum that is always and forever oriented toward compulsory normativity’
(418). The multitude is made to regurgitate itself in the image of capital, annihilating disability in
the process.
At the same time, the system also codes itself for regeneration. Bioinformational selfrenewal is witnessed in a curious alteration to the DSM’s title. McGuire (2017: 408) notices that
‘[w]hile the first four editions of the DSM use Riman numeral designators (i.e., DSM-II, DSM-III
etc.), the fifth edition uses an Arabic number “5”’. Instead of DSM-V, it was released as DSM-5,
or perhaps what they really meant: DSM-5.0. ‘With the help of digital technologies, according to
the APA, we can expect to see a DSM-5.1, 5.2, etc. Updates to the manual will now be ongoing,
incremental—more like system updates/upgrades’ (McGuire 2017: 408). Like cellphone operating
system updates—OS 14.1, 14.2, 14.3—which fix bugs and install new ones, bioinformational

capitalism too will spontaneously update and upgrade the multitude. The APA says that ‘Ongoing
revisions of DSM-5 will make it a ''living document," adaptable to future discoveries in
neurobiology, genetics, and epidemiology’ (DSM-5 2013: 13). The DSM itself becomes ‘a selfreplicating organism’ (Peters et al. 2020: 6) on the orders of bio informationalism. The bio and
digital fuse, necessarily making disability their central target. We have also witnessed a
‘thickening of the DSM’—which has expanded from 500 to a thousand pages over the last 30 years
(McGuire 2017: 405-406). Individual diagnostic categories are expanding and ‘more and more
detail is going into describing the minutiae of individual disorders’ (406).
The ’epidemic’ of autism could instead be interpreted as the ‘epidemic’ of bioinformational
capitalism’s war against opacity and unintelligibility. Indeed, Hanna Ebben (2008) writes that the
‘epidemic’ is based on the ‘desire to recognize the undesirable,’ which is ‘manifested through ways
of perceiving that assume that autism and disability appear to people, and that such appearances
need our urgent consideration in order to prevent further spreading of assumed pathologies’ (160).
Put differently, this is the desire for visibility and articulation for, as every minutiae of disability
is exposed to the eyes of capital, the demand for visibility and transparency is realized. These are
the consequences of embodying the multitude’s challenge to intelligence and communicability.
The oppression of disabled life animates the importance of refusing this desire. It animates the
importance of developing an anti-capitalist and disabling knowledge ecology that can resist in the
age of bioinformaionalism. Stupidity will be a key aspect of the alternative knowledge ecology—
and can assist in the struggle toward socialist and anti-imperialist horizons. This, however, will
depend on our insistence that stupidity is divorced from and not in a relation with intelligence and
knowledge, for as long as they two are approached as intertwined, the former will always be a
means to generate the latter.
Disability And Stupidity as Anti-Imperialist Resistance
At this point, we want to pause for a moment to consider stupidity’s specific challenge to
imperialism. As a form of capitalism, imperialism too has saturated pedagogy: rendering it not
only productivist, but also colonial. We may notice colonial tones in how we often talk about
learning: ‘mastering’ a subject, ‘discovering’ a new theory, ‘exploring a topic.’ The learner is
imagined as a conquistador invading indigenous unknowns, discovering new lands, ripping the
veil off of exotic people, and dragging everything into the light of scrutiny.
As inhabitants of the unknown, disabled and colonized people are taken to war. Across
many histories and timelines, empire has waged war against indigenous people. They are mined
for value by mechanisms that measure and quantify formerly inaccessible sources of profit (Moore
and Robinson 2016: 2779): searching for new markets and natural resources. This is the reason
why anti-colonial and decolonial struggles have long protected their unknowns, insisting on
inaccessibility of their knowledge systems. Indigenous peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas
have lived and died in the name of blocking access to their ancestral lands and knowledges. They
were right to, for the moment European hands touched their ancient knowledges of medicine, diet,

agriculture, geography, technology, language, and culture, they evaporated immediately into the
profit motive.
Instead of mimicking imperialism’s arrogance toward the unknown, we require forms of
knowledge that allow the unknown to simply be. A knowledge that can accommodate confusion,
uncertainty, and lack of productivity. Not beholden to a profit motive, socialist knowledge is
peaceful toward disability, and is comprised of stupidity. An example and practice of stupidity as
anti-imperialism may be found in Beth A. Ferri’s (2018) account of her autoimmune illness.
Ferri is diagnosed with a rare blood disorder called chronic autoimmune neutropenia (12).
She explains that doctors always describe disease by using war metaphors. Contagion is posited
as an external enemy, a terrorist, who must be defeated before it invades. Disease talk invokes
‘legacies of war and empire’ that rely on ‘ideologies of strength and conquest’ (2). At this point
we are naturally reminded of the war on autism—yet another instance of disability imperialized.
Autoimmunity, however, poses a paradox to the imperialist narrative. It forces a shift in the
discourse from concern over an external terror to that of internal terror: as Ferri puts it, ‘invisible
sleeper cells hidden inside the body waiting to strike’ (11). Living with an autoimmune illness
herself, however, Ferri feels misrepresented by the war metaphors.
She and other autoimmune people describe their biologies in ways that are more
‘confounding’ than internal warfare (13). They flirt with alternative metaphors such as foolishness,
mystery, and paradox. Ferri (2018) offers testimony of one blogger with Crohn’s Disease who
calls his immune system a ‘tool.’
One day he was checking over things and when he got to my digestive tract he was all like,
‘Whoa, whoa, whoa. What the hell is going on here? You guys are infected!’ And my
digestive tract was like, ‘What the hell are you talking about. Are you drunk again?’ And,
so my tool of an immune system sets about ‘CURING’ my NOT sick digestive tract (13).
This confused biology sometimes leads its person down painful, chronic paths, and sometimes
down comical ones. An acknowledgement of confusion, and self-awareness of incompetence feels
more accurate to the blogger. Ferri herself offers another metaphor for her biology: that of fantasy
and mystery. She writes:
Alternative metaphors like mystery or the experience of Alice from the novel Alice in
Wonderland, who finds herself in a curious new world after falling down a rabbit hole,
highlight a common experience of living with an autoimmune disease—one that is very
much outside of discursive certainty and medicine’s preferred biomedical frameworks of
cure (Ferri 2018: 13).
Here, biology finds itself in a state of dreamy stupor: wandering through an inexplicable
scape (the unknown) after losing all sense of place and time. In this mystery, there are more
questions than answers—as the wonderland exists outside of biomedical certainty. Autoimmunity

might also be ‘a paradox’ Ferri suggests—‘A self-contradiction. A contradictory self’ (15). All
these metaphors offer alternative ways to know—stupid possibilities that lead us away from
military conclusions. Confusion, mystery, and paradox are all stupid knowledges that emerge when
disabled people think through their own experiences. These are all open questions that do not
present any path or need to secure answers. The source of stupor’s power is in its rejection of a
productive pedagogy; its disavowal of intelligence. We return now, once again to stupidity’s antivalue to more deeply understand its resistance to capitalism (and imperialism).
Organizing Anti-Value: Spreading Stupidity
Productivist pedagogy moves from ignorance to knowledge. In the beginning of Daniel R.
DeNicola’s (2017) Understanding Ignorance, he quickly separates ignorance from stupidity.
While ignorance is ‘a lack of knowledge’, stupidity ‘is a mental dullness that indicates an inability
to learn or a sustained disinterest in learning’ and unreason is ‘any type of irrationality, such as
intentional but self-defeating actions or the affirmation of contradictory beliefs’ (DeNicola 2017:
8). Learning is the fundamental movement from ignorance to knowledge, which once completed
eliminates ignorance. The various forms of ignorance, he writes, ‘may be removed or annihilated
by learning, though different modes of learning may be necessary. The range of learning is as wide
as the range of remediable ignorance’ (26). The annihilation of ignorance by learning, however,
remains trapped in a cycle of production insofar as learning creates ignorance. We learn
something, and then we have a host of questions and unknowns that arise as a result, ‘new
knowledge has generated new questions, questions that could not have been asked previously’
(184).
DeNicola (2017: 8) sums up the difference: ‘Ignorance can be remedied; stupidity is
intractable.’ It is precisely this intractability that interests us as a form of resistance to capital’s
command over life and labor insofar as stupidity’s intractability is an intransigent anti-value.
Because stupidity can’t be educated, its unknowabilty, opacity, and muteness endures beyond
measure by remaining inarticulable and incommunicable. While databanks can store knowledge
and knowledge’s lack or absence, no technologies can quantify stupidity, nor can they discern or
articulate it. Stupidity as such is the pedagogical form of working-class refusal. As Tronti (2009:
259) notes, as long as the demands of workers can be ‘recognised by the capitalists themselves as
objective needs of the production of capital … they are not only subsumed, but solicited; no longer
simply rejected, but collectively negotiated’. When Tronti asks ‘what happens when the form of
working-class organisation takes on a wholly alternative content’ when it ‘refuses to function as
an articulation of capitalist society’ (295), he’s posing the necessity of an alternative pedagogical
logic, one that is incompatible with productivist pedagogy. In our age of bioinformational
capitalism, moreover, stupidity is incalculable, incapable of abstraction, self-improvement, and
innovation. We can now finally appreciate why capital’s waged a relentless war against autism,
why disability activism is a form of anti-capitalist resistance, and why anti-colonial and decolonial
struggles have insisted on the inaccessibility of their knowledge systems.

We would like to end by proposing how writing can be a way of spreading stupidity, first
by noting how stupidity infuses Marx’s own writings, particularly his writing as research. Indeed,
here it’s interesting to note that just before he moves to the fragment on machines in his reading
of the Grundrisse, Antonio Negri (1991: 139) admits he is ‘always stupefied to see the power of
Marx’s intuitions, the extraordinary anticipations of the Grundrisse’. What Negri finds so useful
about the notebooks is the way they perform Marx’s own stupor. The research and writing, he
says, is ‘open on all sides: every conclusion that takes the form of a presentation of the research
opens spaces to new research and presentation’ (Negri 1991: 12). As such, ‘there is no linear
continuity, but only a plurality of points of view, which are endlessly solicited at each determinant
moment of the antagonism’ (13). It is telling that in the English translation of the Grundrisse, the
title of the text remains untranslated. While it’s typically translated as ‘rough draft’, Thomas
Kemple (1995: 18) notes that another possible translation is ‘ruptures-in-reason’. Even as Marx
sought to articulate and present the inner logics of capital, he constellated this presentation with
constant returns to stupor: by trailing off into digressions, breaking off notes at certain points, and
also by leaving certain words untranslated and thereby preserving their intractable
incommunicability and refusing to transform their opacity into a transparency.
We can also find such a constellation in the text most generally opposed to the Grundrisse:
the first volume of Capital. While this text is Marx’s magnum opus—his clearest exposition of the
inner workings of capital—it is by no means defined only by articulation. In fact, the text ends, we
argue, by a return to stupor. The penultimate chapter of the volume contains Marx’s most succinct
and categorical recounting of the transition to capitalism (as the negation of individual private
property) to the negation of the negation, when the ‘expropriators are expropriated’ (Marx
1867/1967: 715). Yet Marx doesn’t end the book here, after this clarion call for revolution, one
presented in a way that could be read teleologically and even deterministically. Instead, Marx ends
with a short and rather dry exposition of Ebbon Wakefield’s theory of colonialism. There’s no
revolutionary conclusion, no call to arms, no declarations of what is to be done. The effect is to
return the reader to the openness of capital and to the stupor of thought that persists within Marx’s
intellect. Marx returns us to a state of stupor and indeterminacy.
Moving outside of Marx and the Marxist cannon, another example of writing spreading
stupidity can be found in John Cage’s silent writing. While many scholars have debated the
meaning of Cage’s silence about his own sexuality, Andy Weaver (2012) focuses on how silence
is blocked together with Cage’s articulations. One place this shows up is Cage’s ‘Where are we
Eating? and What are we eating?’ It seems to be about Cage’s homosexual relationship with dancer
and choreographer Merce Cunningham, yet we don’t learn about this through the poem itself. The
poem merely ‘catalogues a series of meals that Cage, Cunningham, and members of Cunningham’s
dance troupe ate while touring’ (Weaver 2012: 20). Rather than confess any relationship, Cage
merely lists mundane moments of their time together, producing an opaque idiom that resists
visibility.
As a result, ‘Cage’s work shows not only that silence can be politically agential and
challenging to the status quo, but how to make silence an effective tool of socio-political critique’

(20). The idiom remains mute and opaque—we are stupid in the face of it—which is precisely its
political efficacy. It remains, as Weaver puts it, ‘alternative without being oppositional’ (34). This
is a politics that, in line with Tronti (2019), refuses to articulate a program that capital could
accommodate or even understand. The alternative is a silence that we also find in Marx, but what
we have in mind here is that Marx leaves us with at the end of the third volume of Capital, which
as Althusser reminds us, ends with ‘A title: Classes. Forty lines, then silence’ (Althusser and
Balibar 1968/2009: 214, emphasis in original). Instead, it’s a silence that inhabits the form of the
writing’s end, one silence inaugurated not by death but by the very indeterminacy of Marx’s
thought.
Given capital’s dynamism, however, it would be irresponsible to assert that such opacity
represents a permanent form of anti-value. Nonetheless, in our current configuration of
bioinformational capitalism—no less than its previous forms—capital’s desire for visibility and
transparency remains absolutely central to its regimes exploitation and dispossession as well as to
its ability to command labor.
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